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In this thesis field artillery operations and fire
support decisions are examined. The history of the develop-
ment of artillery fire support systems is reviewed in order
to provide insight into artillery missions. Standard tac-
tical missions are identified and analyzed as well as fire
planning and fire support coordination. A specific scenario
is analyzed in detail with respect to the fire support deci-
sion process. This work attempts to provide the background
information necessary for the construction of more realistic
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I. INTRODUCTION
The ultimate end of field artillery is fire. The basic
mission of the United States Army Field Artillery, "is to
provide continuous and timely fire support to the force
commander." [14,3] Actually this "timely fire support" is
given to the individual maneuver element, whether it is an
infantryman or a tank. The wording is misleading, but it
is quite common in military logic and writing to consider
support to the unit, as, "support to the commander." Fire
is the only reason for artillery's existence, and without
supporting the maneuver forces, it literally has no reason
for being. The proper use and employment of artillery on
the modern battlefield is an exact science. As with any
technical subject, the understanding of field artillery
techniques and tactics, and the ability to make fire support
decisions is acquired only through proper study and diligent
application of the basic principles involved.
Since field artillery is used as a supporting element on
the battlefield, it enters land combat simulations as part
of combined arms problems. Land combat has been modeled in
a wide variety of ways. There exist ground combat analysis
models that were originally developed in support of specific
Army analytic tasks. These models have evolved from simple
differential equation, Lanchester-type models, to the high
resolution simulations of brigade and division size units in

combat. [1, 5] The major methodology of recent years has been
the building of large unit models by integrating the outputs
from separate small unit models such as CARMONETTE. [8 , ii]
This method of aggregation may be used to create division
and theater level models of combat.
The analytic community studying Army problems generally
has looked at the combined arms -- armor, infantry, artillery
-- scenarios. Their technique has been the use of war games
or combat simulations of varying degrees of complexity and
detail. However, the high level (theater) war games often
begin with input in the form of "firepower scores or other
equally unconvincing indeces .
" [8 ,A-2] These firepower scores,
"have by now been thoroughly discredited -- see, for example,
the discussion in RAC-R-121, MEFORD, and RAC-R-145, EFC-II --
and an alternative must be found.
" [8 ,A-2] Although this
source has made an excellent case against the use of fire
power scores as input data, it goes on to suggest the build-
ing of a theater model by creating a theater-level war game
composed of assessment output from the Division Battle Model,
(DBM)
.
[8 ,A-2] This idea is sound in theory, for a whole
series of models could be combined and the final theater
level war game would then be an aggregation of all the
smaller component units.
As Barr pointed out, [1,6] there is a drawback in this
"model stacking" approach. For instance, any errors or
inaccuracies in the smaller unit models will be carried
forward and perhaps even multiplied as several small unit

models are combined. The alternative to this error is to
make the small unit models more and more detailed. This
high resolution, however, does not come cheap. Observation
of the amount of storage space and computer time required
for the smallest high resolution models, impress the analyst
that a high resolution model of theater-level conflict is
not presently feasible.
The above discussion serves to identify the need for a
more realistic, and practical approach to constructing
theater level models of combat. This thesis does not try to
build such a mathematical model. Rather, it addresses only
one element in the combined arms combat team, the field
artillery. This work investigates field artillery techniques,
tactics, and fire support decisions.
It is hoped that this thesis will serve to assist future
analysts in their attempts to model artillery fire as input
in combined arms combat simulations. For this reason,
considerable effort was placed in reconstructing a capsulized
artillery chronology from various sources. As the following
section on the historical development of field artillery makes
clear, the conduct of war- is an art based on fundamental con-
cepts and principles. These principles have remained valid
over the years, almost in spite of the prevailing weapons and
tactics of the day.
It is imperative then, that a modern analyst at least be
familiar with the development of the tactics and techniques
of the artillery. Once this has been accomplished, it will

be obvious that using firepower scores, for instance, as
artillery input in high level combat simulations is not
realistically acceptable. But what is more important, these
analysts will then have a better idea of how to improve
this input, and make artillery a realistic component in an
overall combat scenario.
As stated, this thesis does not attempt to present final,
workable models for artillery in a combined arms scenario.
It does try to provide valuable background information from
various artillery sources in order to clarify and capsulize
the considerations required in detailed artillery models.
This thesis has done much of the background investigation
in field artillery techniques and fire support, and can serve
to point the way for future efforts to realistically model




"The value of military history is in the. creative
perception of the experience and lessons of the
past, in the capability to disclose the regular
laws, of the development of methods for the con-
duct of war, in its boundless capabilities for
the expansion of the military thinking of officers
and generals." [11,5]
This quotation from the works of A. Grechko, a noted
Marshal of the Soviet Union, could be expanded to also
include the effect of history on the military thinking of
technicians and those analysts concerned with accurately
modeling land combat in the modern military environment.
This however, does justify the following section on the
historical development of field artillery, and its inclusion
in this analysis. For proper understanding of a phenomenon
it is necessary to study its past. This helps to clarify
the path of its development, and makes it easier to under-
stand its interdependence and ties with other related
phenomenon. [11 , 5] Military theory and its related analysis
cannot ignore the past, for it is through history that
isolated developments are placed in their proper perspective.
Former president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a letter to
the United States Corps of Cadets on 22 April 1959, encouraged
the study of military history to, "impart a level of military
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experience and judgement", which one could not otherwise
accumulate in a lifetime. [5,i]
A strong interdependence exists between current artillery
techniques and the physical evolution of guns, ammunition,
and fire support coordination. For these reasons the follow-
ing chronology traces the development of artillery from the
earliest known weapons to today.
A. ARTILLERY PRIOR TO CANNONS
The forerunners of modern cannon were war engines of
primitive design. The earliest artillery pieces in general
use were catapults, ballistas and later the trebuchet. The
only real difference in these weapons and the modern artil-
lery pieces was the nature of the propelling force that
lofts the projectile toward the enemy. Manucy [10,1] docu-
ments the use of "ingenious machines" against the walls of
Jerusalem in the eighth century B.C. These predecessors of
the catapult and ballista used twisted ropes for the propul-
sion of solid stone projectiles. This early use of artillery
as seige engines was to dominate the thinking of artillerists
for nearly the next two thousand years. Figures 1 and 2
show the ballista and catapult as they were constructed in
this early period. [19,2] The ballista had horizontal arms
like a bow, and fired its projectile in a low trajectory








Here it will serve the reader well to know that the three
basic types of artillery weapons are guns, howitzers, and
mortars. The guns have a low flat trajectory, and conse-
quently generally have a higher muzzle velocity. The howit-
zer has a medium high trajectory between the extremes of the
gun and the mortar. It represents the best features of the
other two. The mortar has a very high (steep) trajectory.
It generally lacks mobility in large calibers, but can
attack specialized targets. The catapult was capable of
hurling a one hundred-pound stone some 600 yards [10,1] much
like the modern mortars.
It was not until the military genius of Alexander the
Great in the fourth century B.C. that catapults were moved
onto the battlefield to break up enemy infantry concentra-
tions. [20,348] Before Alexander, artillery had been used
exclusively in seiges. He can also be credited with intro-
ducing modern concepts of firepower, to include the artillery
preparation on the objective prior to an attack by infantry.
This tactic of using artillery, in the form of catapults,
against maneuver forces was a sound practice, and indicates
why Alexander was able to conquer much of the known world of
his day before reaching the age of 33. Interestingly this
highly effective use of artillery did not come into general
use until almost the seventeenth century.
During the Roman seige of Syracuse (214-212 B.C.) the
attackers learned the devastating effect of catapults turned
against the beseiging force. [10,2] Archimedes, the Greek
14

mathematician engineered the use of artillery against the
Romans and their ships from the fortified city. Unlike the
example of Alexander the Great with mobile artillery, this
principle of defending a fortification with artillery was
widely received, and was practiced for centuries, even until
the early days of our own country. Probably the most famous
recent use of this technique was in the building of the
Maginot line, a system of defenses built by the French along
the German border between 1928 and 1939.
The techniques of seige and counter-seige with simple
artillery held for centuries. In fact even after cannon were
introduced, the catapult, ballista and trebuchets were used
side by side with the early guns. The trebuchet was another
\var machine that received extensive use in the seige of
medieval European castles.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY CANNONS
The next significant development in artillery came with
the invention of gunpowder. It is known that the Chinese
were producing an explosive mixture in very early times. The
western world became at least cognizant of this substance as
early as the fourth century A.D. A ninth century manuscript
found in Europe contains a crude formula for gunpowder.
[10,3] Primitive cannon seem to have existed in the orient
as early as the twelfth century.
The Moors are credited with the first use of firearms in
western Europe at the Battle of Saragossa in the twelfth
15

century. [10,3] They probably also introduced the original
cannon, a small, wooden, mortar-like piece that resembled
the later bombards of Europe.
It was not until the Hundred Year's War (1339-1453) that
early cannon came into general use. These primitive weapons
consisted of no more than iron or bronze tubes laid directly
on the ground and elevated by the mounding of earth under the
muzzles. [10,3] These weapons were grossly inaccurate, and
were used basically as seige weapons. Of course such a use
is obvious, since the time required for setting up and
elevating the tube would be too great for attacking anything
but a stationary target. Recall that the early catapults
were also used primarily as seige engines; the parallel is
obvious.
The race for building ever bigger bombards was furious
during the fifteenth century. The largest caliber gun of
all time, according to Manucy, was the Great Mortar of
Moscow. [10,4] This weapon was built about 1525 and fired a
projectile weighing a ton. The barrel was eighteen feet long
and it fired a stone projectile thirty-six inches in diameter.
Early guns of this size spelled doom for the majestic,
towering castles of Europe. Lower profile fortifications
were built in the sixteenth century, and later these were
abandoned in favor of reinforced earth works. Throughout the
sixteenth century the technological improvements in metal-
lurgy brought tremendous improvements in cannons. Coincident
with these improvements in the art of casting were refinements
16

in the formula for making gunpowder, and the use of cast iron
balls as projectiles. The improved casting techniques served
to lighten the guns and at the same time make them stronger.
This permitted the guns to be respectively more maneuverable
and longer shooting. Trunnions were now cast on each side
of the tube to aid in elevation, and permitted- mounting on
crude carriages to improve mobility.
Columbus brought the first cannons to this continent.
In fact there was a literal baptism of fire for the New
World. According to Manucy, the lookout on the "Pinta" first
sighted land and fired a small bombard to notify Columbus on
his flag ship, "Santa Maria". [10,5] Thus, from the very
moment of discovery, artillery has played a part in the
development of the Americas.
During the sixteenth century the ships continued to
bring cannon to the New World. Not only the vessels were
armed with guns though, the Spanish built numerous forts and
armed them with ample weapons to defend their ownership of
the treasures of America. In 1586 Drake took fourteen bronze
guns from the fortification at St. Augustine. These highly
ornamented pieces were of a variety of calibers and designs,
all founded between 1546 and 1555. [10,5]
It was also during the sixteenth century that the first
scientific treatise on gunnery was published. Many concepts
appeared at this time, but because of a lag in technology,
they were abandoned to wait for the proper materials and
manufacturing processes. For instance, such improvements as
17

breech loading guns, and spiral rifling appeared in the 1500 's
but due to imperfections were discarded for the proven muzzle-
loaded smooth bore type pieces.
Guns appeared on the battlefield rolling along in crude
carts as early as the Hussite Wars of Bohemia (1419-24) [3,39]
and once again the concept of using relatively light, mobile
artillery on the battlefield against infantry type targets
came into general acceptance. As with the development of
tactics for the use of catapults, the deployment of cannon
against soft, mobile targets depended on the right tactician
and the right battle, coupled with the technical state of the
art in weaponry. The sixteenth century was a difficult
period for artillerymen. As the musket developed, the task
of muzzle loading and servicing an artillery piece became
increasingly hazardous work. In addition, the weapons them-
selves were extremely dangerous. It was common for artiller-
ists to be injured by exploding weapons, muzzle bursts of the
projectile, and delayed discharge of misfires. Even as
artillery achieved use on the battlefield, most pieces were
extremely heavy and their carriages were poorly designed and
difficult to maneuver. The use of from ten to twenty horses
to move a single gun was common practice and depended on the
condition of the terrain over which the move was made, as well
as on the size and design of the piece. Ammunition in this
period was of three basic types. By far the most common was
the solid ball. Usually this was a cast-iron round shot, but
some solid stone shot were still being used at this point in
18

history. The bomb, a round iron shell filled with gun powder,
was designed for basic use against personnel. Also anti-
personnel in nature, but for closer ranges, were the cannister
and grape-shot. The cannister was a cylindrical can filled
with small projectiles. Musket balls were frequently used
for this purpose. The grape-shot was a cluster of iron balls
arranged symmetrically on an iron or wooden core. Sometimes
this cluster was then covered with fabric to aid in storing
and handling the projectiles.
A significant observation should be made here. During
the four hundred or so years from the earliest cannon con-
struction to this point in our chronology, the guns had
improved dramatically. The early pot-de-fer (Fig. 3) had
developed into guns that could throw shot almost as far as
any gun used in the Civil War. [10,7] Breechloaders and
rifled bores had been discovered and carriages and elevating
mechanisms had been used. In other words, artillerymen now
possessed at least the basic tools of the same arm that is
today so devastating on the battlefield. The ingredient they
lacked in 1600 was the technique of employment that make
modern artillery the greatest casualty producer in conventional
battle. It remained now only for the development of massed
fire, increased mobility, efficient organization and tactical
employment to place artillery forever supreme over small arms
on the battlefield. Although this observation is quite




Figure 3. Pot de fer
C. CANNONS BECOME MOBILE
During the seventeenth century the Swedish warrior, King
Gustavus Adolphus and his artillery chief, Lennart Torstensson
devised a new battle plan involving extensive use of artillery
and cavalry. [18,2] Artillery began to be employed with great
mobility against soft targets much as it is today. This plan
involved the use of lighter and more mobile artillery to smash
the opposing infantry while the friendly cavalry neutralized
the large, relatively immobile enemy artillery. With this
need for mobility in his artillery, Gustavus removed all guns
heavier than a 12-pounder from his field artillery. [10,7]
Using this overall strategy Sweden soundly defeated the
20

Spanish at the Battle of Brietenfeld in 1631. The Spanish
defeat was mainly due to the mobility of Gustavus* artillery,
and the kings and generals of Europe rushed to develop light
field guns for their own armies. Although this strategy was
unique in its day, the concept was introduced by Alexander
the Great many centuries before. Like Alexander, Gustavus
also knew the value of fire concentration and initiated the
techniques of massing his artillery in strong batteries
against infantry targets.
In his quest for small, light artillery pieces, Gustavus
developed a gun light enough to be drawn and served by only
two men. This weapon was called the "leathern". [10,7] The
gun was made by screwing a copper tube into a brass breech
and covering the tube with layers of mastic and plaster to
equalize the pressures of firing. This tube was then covered
with a boiled, varnished leather sleeve to protect it from
the elements, and accounts for the strange name.
Torstensson developed two artillery pieces vastly super-
ior to the "leathern". His cast-iron four and nine-pounder
demi-culverin were recognized as the ultimate field pieces of
the day and led to complete abandonment of the leathern,
because of its small allowable charge. The four-pounder
weighed only about 500 pounds and was easily transported by a
team of two horses. (Fig. 4) The light artillery of Gustavus
looks remarkably like guns of a much later day, and was




Figure 4. Cannon, 1650 Period
Also in the seventeenth century artillery began to be
organized into permanent military units. Prior to this time
the artillerists were like civilian tradesmen, and only their
commander was a military officer. Louis XIV of France
established schools of instruction for artillery in 1671 and
raised a regiment of artillerymen. [18,2]
In the eighteenth century, Frederick the Great of Prussia
became of necessity an innovator in artillery tactics. The
gradual depletion of his veteran Prussian infantry in the
Seven Years War (1756-63) necessitated a shift in tactics to
rely more heavily on his artillery. [10,10] Frederick intro-
duced the first horse artillery to follow closely, and
support his highly efficient cavalry. Like Gustavus,
Frederick's field artillery had only light guns and howitzers.
The significant tactical contribution was his use of mobility
and maneuver by positioning and repositioning of his batteries
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according to the course of the battle. In other words,
with his extreme mobility, he was able to truely influence
the course of the battle by moving his field guns to the
right place at the right time.
During the Seven Years War, Frederick defeated a com-
bined French and German force that outnumbered him by three
to one. By cleverly feinting retreat, Frederick drew the
enemy into a salient and closed the trap by attacking with
cavalry and firing many vollies from his horse artillery
units who had moved into range behind the cavalry. [18,2]
The French artillerist, Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval
brought back a number of ideas on artillery tactics after
serving in the French force against Frederick. Although
Gribeauval did not become Inspector General of Artillery until
1776, he revoluntionized French artillery, and vitally
effected the artillery tactics of other countries as well.
Gribeauval is regarded as the most outstanding artillerist of
the 1700' s and is responsible for the new tactics which
Napoleon introduced so successfully. [10,11] Some of
Gribeauval' s innovations included the bringing up of artillery
at a gallop behind the cavalry, thus gaining superiority of
fire very quickly. He also reduced the length and weight of
pieces with improved metallurgy, and improved carriages for
both field and coastal guns. For coast artillery he used a
traversing platform employing wheels on a track that greatly
simplified the tracking of moving targets. [10,11]
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Napoleon's artillery didn't use an artillery preparation
to soften up the opposing infantry, but galloped up to fire
cannister or grape-shot at almost point blank range. Columns
of cavalry led infantry as they rushed in to exploit the
opening made by the devastating close range artillery attack.
Napoleon's artillery was smooth bore and muzzle loaded. Its
ammunition was irregular and seldom fit true. Guns were
traversed by shifting their trails and elevated with simple
wedges. Since recoil mechanisms were still unknown, the
direct fire pieces were relaid after each shot. [6,vi] Even
without these modern refinements, much of Napoleon's success
depended on his masterly use of field artillery.
D. AMERICAN ARTILLERY
Meanwhile there was also some historical significance in
artillery in North America in the eighteenth century. One of
the first artillery engagements was at Louisbourg when the
French fort fell to a joint British and Colonial force in
1745. [3,39] With the storming of the great fortress of
Louisbourg against, "long odds and logical military expecta-
tion," [3,16] Colonial artillerymen gained valuable experience
and a lasting confidence that would serve them well in the
Revolution.
Henry Knox was appointed Chief of the Continental Artil-
lery on 17 November 1775. [18,3] Knox was a twenty-six year
old book salesman from Boston, and even though he had been
highly recommended to Washington, he was faced with problems
24

that would have challenged and taxed an experienced artil-
lerist. The Continental artillery was faced with acute
shortages of gunpowder, ammunition, and even of guns. [3,29]
The Colonies had depended upon England for gunpowder, so
now with the outbreak of hostilities, all other sources were
scoured for the precious grains. [3,29] The search for cannon
was one of Knox's first concerns. A New York militia company
raided a British battery on Manhattan Island in August of
1775, and successfully removed twenty-one nine-pounders.
[12,38] Knox personally organized an expedition to move
fifty-nine selected cannon a distance of three hundred miles
in the dead of winter from Fort Ticonderoga to Boston. [3,32]
On 24 January 1776, Colonel Knox presented General Washington
with, "a noble train of artillery," [12,39] with which to bom-
bard Boston. So effective were the American guns that the
British set sail for Halifax on 17 March 1776 with Washington's
guarantee of safe passage from the harbor. [12,39]
The Battle of Trenton on 26 December 1776 was an outstand-
ing example of Knox's excellent grasp of artillery tactics.
He moved his artillery in column with the infantry so they
could be quickly put into action. [18,4] These tactics were
successfully used by Frederick the Great some fifteen years
earlier in Europe. Later Napoleon was to use this strategy
to fully benefit from his mobile field artillery. In this
battle, Knox so proved his ability as an adequate, even
brilliant artillery commander, that he was promoted to
Brigadier General on the twenty-eighth of December.
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With the sources of importation cut off, the colonists
began casting both bronze and iron guns. As gunpowder be-
came more available, ammunition was manufactured to include
bombs and case shot as well as the standard round shot and
grape-shot.
At the Battle of Monmouth in June of 1778, General Knox
massed his fire in concentrations of eight to ten guns at
critical points on the battlefield. [18,5] The firing was so
intense it was reported as, "the severest artillery fire ever
heard in America." [3,57]
The final major artillery action of the Revolution was at
Yorktown. In this final battle the Continental infantry
moved forward to within four hundred yards and secured the
movement of artillery forward to this devastating range. The
combined artillery silenced the British guns until, "only a
single mortar and a few coehorns still fired." [3,60] Here
again we see Knox's brilliant use of the principles of mass
and maneuver in classic artillery engagement. The Revolution
had found American field artillery equal or superior to any
artillery of the period. After the Battle of Monmouth,
General Washington included the ultimate compliment in a
General Order dated 29 June, 1778, "... that the enemy has
done them the justice to acknowledge that no artillery could
be better served than ours." [3,38]
As the United States moved into the nineteenth century
many refinements were made in artillery gunnery and weapons
manufacturing. The first American horse artillery drilled
26

for Congress on 4 July 1808. [3,64] Americans were now
following the example of Gustavus and more recently, Napoleon
in their attempt to stay up to date with their artillery
techniques.
It was in the War of 1812 that Americans saw their first
rocket fired as an artillery weapon. At Baltimore, the
British fired rockets against the Americans, but lost the
artillery battle anyhow. They were attempting to subdue Fort
McHenry, a post guarding Baltimore Harbor. [18,6] This was
incidently the battle that inspired the writing of our
National Anthem, with its reference to the "rocket's red
glare". The targets of the rockets were really the minds
more than the bodies of the American infantry. The rockets
appeared "to be darting directly at each watching soldier,
making him shake in his boots,..." [3,71] Although the rockets
were inherently inaccurate, they were relatively ineffective
as a casualty producing weapon, even when they were near the
target. The British also unveiled an improved anti-personnel
round in this war. In 1784 Lieutenant Henry Shrapnel
invented a spherical case shot with a time fuse to ignite the
bursting charge. [3,75] This shell proved much more devastat-
ing than canister, grape or bombs.
The Artillery School of Practice was established in 1824
at Fort Monroe, Virginia. This was the first service school
in our country, and provided translation of European artil-
lery manuals and professional investigations of artillery
techniques of the day.
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The nineteenth century saw tremendous improvements in
metallurgy, sighting equipment and ammunition. Although
earlier attempts at rifling of cannon have been noted, it
was not until 1846 that rifled iron, breech-loading cannon
were independently produced in both Italy and Germany. [10,14]
Rifling, of course stabilizes the projectile in flight by
imparting a spin to the round as it travels down the tube.
This allows the use of a longer, larger projectile and keeps
the point facing the direction of flight, thus increasing
accuracy and opening the way for point detonated fuses.
Other advantages of a rifled projectile are the increased
range, and greater striking energy.
In 1855 an Englishman, Lord Armstrong designed an
artillery piece (Fig. 5) that employed many of the refine-
ments of the preceding century. [10,14] The rifled, breech-
loaded cannon was constructed with hoops shrunk over the
tube to increase its strength. This "built-up" construction
Figure 5. Cannon, 1855

permitted a great reduction in weight of the tube. Captain
T. J, Rodman, an Army Ordnance officer, revolutionized the
casting of gun tubes during the Civil War with a unique method
of cooling. The molten iron was poured around a water-cooled
core, allowing the inner walls of the tube to solidify first.
As the outer metal cooled it contracted and compressed the
inner layers imparting much greater strength to the tube to
resist an exploding charge. [10,17] The popular "Parrot Gun"
was invented in 1861 by Captain Robert Parrott, of the United
States Army. It was a rifled iron cannon of built-up
construction much like the English Armstrong. [3,119] This
weapon was probably the most effective seige rifle in the
United States inventory. [10,16] Cast-iron guns were to have
a rapid replacement as techniques of casting and forging
steel improved daily.
The Civil War was basically an infantry battleground, but
artillery played an important role in many exchanges. The
use of rifled small arms provided the infantryman with greater
accuracy and range than the artillery, and permitted sharp-
shooters to pick off gun crews one at a time as they serviced
their pieces. [18,8] The new rifled cannons were found to be
ineffective in the Civil War for two reasons. First, unless
they scored a direct hit, the shells burrowed into the soft
earth and did little damage. An improved point detonated
fuse was needed. The terrain of the forested, rolling, com-
partmentalized battlefields of the Civil War favored the
muzzle-loaders with their larger rounds and shorter ranges.
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The foremost field piece of this conflict was a muzzle-loading
smooth bore modeled after a cannon designed by Napolean III.
[3,120] Batteries of "Napoleons" were light, strong, and
almost as mobile as horse artillery.
It has been said that during the Civil War, "artillery
technology took a step backward." [18,8] This is a statement
based on the increased use of smooth-bore, rather than rifled
cannon, and it is not true in general. Even with the
increased use of muzzle-loading smooth bores, the artillerists'
use of classic principles was devastating in several battles.
The deadly infantry fire of "minnie balls" served to force
artillery farther to the rear and necessitated further
development.
The battles in which artillery played an important role
in the Civil War must be limited in this chronology. The
interested reader is referred to the Battles of Manasses
(First Bull Run), Shiloh, Richmond, Bull Run (Second),
Antietam, Fredricksburg, Chancellorsville , Gettysburg and
Vicksburg for excellent examples of artillery tactics,
including the spectrum of tactics and use from seige to
close defense. By the end of the Civil War new fuses were
developed which caused the rifled projectiles to burst on
contact, and the real potential of the rifled artillery's
improved range and accuracy could be realized.
It is proper to place on record that the Confederates
pioneered the organization and administration techniques that
form the backbone of today's artillery units. They were the
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first to break up grand army reserves and distribute artil-
lery to the divisions, retaining only a Corps reserve. [2,94]
In the years following the Civil War until the turn of the
century, the vital changes that took place in artillery can
really be called the change into modern field artillery. No
longer was the infantryman the greatest casualty producing
element. In World War I for instance, artillery produced
over seventy-five percent of the battlefield casualties, and
became known as the "King of Battle".
Smokeless powder was developed by the Prussians in 1865.
[3,179] The dense white clouds of burning black powder were
now obsolete. Even though the smokeless powder offered
advantages in enemy detection for counter-battery fire, the
United States continued to issue black powder for "economic
reasons" until its stock was exhausted. [18,10] This practice
was to cost many American lives in the Spanish American War.
Here the enemy, even though a third rate power, was using
smokeless powder, and other up to date material.
Steel came into extensive use for gun founding and per-
mitted the manufacture of steel carriages with recoil mech-
anisms, and breech-loading devices. These improvements should
not be underestimated as they made the entire concept of
indirect fire a reality.
Rifled cannon had by now completely superseded the
smooth-bore for the advantages discussed earlier.
Improved sighting and laying mechanisms refined the tech-
nique of indirect laying, which had been used (somewhat
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crudely), on a few occasions during the Civil War. [3,179]
This method of firing removed the artilleryman from the sting
of improved infantry weapons and permitted them to fire from
protected positions on targets unseen by the gun crews.
Time and impact fuses were improved, making each artillery
round more effective and lethal.
At the dawn of the twentieth century the basic pieces in
field artillery were 3.2- and 3.6-inch guns and a 3.6-inch
mortar. These cannon were even then obsolete when compared
with the model 1897 of the French 75-mm gun. This weapon is
considered the first in the modern family of artillery weapons,
and the first weapon that could be practically used in an
indirect fire role.
E. MODERN ARTILLERY EMERGES
It cannot be over emphasized that modern artillery tech-
niques evolved as the guns and fire support equipment evolved.
The overall evolution of modern artillery pieces was essen-
tially completed by the turn of this century. Recall how the
technique of indirect fire permits the guns to bring devas-
tating fire on an enemy unseen from the guns. Without
indirect fire modern artillery employment and tactics would
be virtually impossible. Now consider the improvements in
artillery material that were necessary to make indirect fire
methods feasible. It was obvious that indirect laying was
impossible without improved panoramic sights, quadrants, aiming
circles, and azimuth instruments. Improvements such as
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recuperators, rifled bores and improved fuses all had impor-
tant roles in the development of indirect fire techniques.
The days of sighting a cannon at point blank range, over
open sights had passed with the Civil War. [7,204] Improved
technology made the guns more powerful and extended their
range, so artillerists began firing at objects actually below
the horizon or behind intervening obstacles. Even with such
a need, as rifled bores helped create, indirect fire would
have been impractical without an effective recoil mechanism.
In' his discussion of the French 75-mm, Farrow explains,
"without a recuperator the gun would leap out of aim with each
shot and have to be pointed anew." [7,152] So it was that
even if an early cannon was laid for indirect fire, it would
have to be relaid prior to each round. This of course would
have made fire much too slow. The recoil mechanism, as
introduced on the French 75-mm, was provided to absorb the
shock of firing by allowing a certain retrograde movement of
the cannon and then return it "into battery" for the next
shot.
In 1907 field artillery was separated from coast artil-
lery, and by Congressional decree the Field Artillery was
defined as "that artillery which accompanies an army in the
field and includes light, horse, seige and mountain artil-
lery." [21,xxix] In 1911 Fort Sill, Oklahoma became the
official home for artillery, when the School of Fire for
Field Artillery was established there. [18,11]
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World War I raised artillery to its rightfully important
level on the battlefield. It was without question that
artillery was now the greatest killer on the field of battle.
The period of World War I saw many refinements in both the
tactics and weapons of field artillery. The "preparation
fire" was introduced and effectively softened the enemy objec-
tives for the infantry. Artillery barrages and extensive
massing of fires were also used in unique ways. This period
also saw the introduction of chemical rounds, and the use of
aerial observation to add a new dimension to observed fire.
[18,13] Artillery also was influenced by developments in
motor transport, signal communication, chemical warfare, tanks,
aviation and mass production.
The French 75-mm gun was the best artillery piece of its
type. It had a rugged recoil system that operated on
glycerin and air, was light, easy to aim, and could fire more
rapidly than any other piece of its day. Farrow claims the
French 75-mm was, "the most useful and most used piece of
artillery in the War." [7,151] The story of industrial mobil-
ization and the phenomenal response of American industry to
the artillery needs of the European battlefield is nothing
short of amazing. The reader is referred to Edward S.
Farrow's, American Guns in the War with Germany
,
[7] for an
extremely detailed and statistically well documented report.
Suffice it here to say that gun makers turned out more cannon
in this period in the United States than had been seen in all
previous history, and, "for every gun of another size produced,
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the United States also turned out a 75-mm." [7,151] The 155-mm
howitzer was the other of the two best known weapons of the
War. This howitzer's development dates back to the nineteenth
century, but its design by the French had, "so strengthened
the structure, and increased the range and increased the
serviceability," [7,157] that it remains a basic artillery
weapon in today's army, having been only slightly modified
from its earliest days.
During the period between the World Wars the field artil-
lery saw many refinements and improvements. Motor transport
had almost entirely replaced horses and many weapons were self-
propelled. Many of the improvements had developed from les-
sons learned in World War I. The introduction of armor in
that war had caused artillerymen to once again turn to larger
calibers. Now, however, transporting these large guns was not
the impossible task it had been in earlier days.
The tactics of field artillery were basically the same as
during the Civil War. Mobility, massing of fires, flexibility
of control and accuracy of delivery remained the basic con-
siderations. With the development and improvement of the fire
direction center (FDC) , devastating concentrations of fire
could be delivered. The fire direction center method of
conducting fire permitted the concentration of two or more
artillery units on a single target. When the fire from per-
haps as many as one hundred guns is accurately directed and




Weapons had been refined, with the greatest improvements
in sighting and firing equipment. The 105-mm howitzers were
in the hands of the troops in World War II and eventually be-
came the standard light artillery weapon of the United States,
and has remained in that status for the last thirty years.
This weapon was a great improvement over the venerable French
75-mm that it replaced. Its rugged carriage was built with a
unique system of pivots on the lower carriage to enable
placement of the gun on a sloping hill side without effecting
the level plane of the upper carriage, and tube. [12,157]
The strong, powerful 155-mm howitzers were modernized and
equipped with pneumatic tires to serve once more, throwing a
95-pound projectile at a sustained rate of fire of one round
per minute.
The American arsenal was further augmented by improving
the 155-mm guns, by 8-inch howitzers and 8-inch guns (ranges
of 12.3 and 24 miles respectively), and the enormous 240-mm
howitzer. [3,239] An American invention, the proximity
(variable time) fuse provided a great advantage in the
lethality of antipersonnel rounds. The fuse contained a tiny
electronic sensor that exploded the projectile when it came
into the "proximity" of any object of sufficient mass. In
addition to its deadly effect providing low air bursts over
soft targets on the ground, it greatly increased the effec-
tiveness of anti-aircraft fire, since direct hits were no
longer required to kill the target. [3,239]
36

An accolade for American field artillery was given after
the War by General of Artillery, Karl Thoholte, of the German
Army.
"In technology, the American excells. The standard-
ization of pieces, the quality of the ammunition,
and communication equipment, and the adjustment of
fires on battery and division artillery level are
superior. ... use of the proximity fuse before any
other nation brought it into action needs no further
praise." [3,253]
The American artillery had served admirably on both fronts.
An example of just how effective the artillery was in massing
fires in the Pacific was evident on Okinawa in April 1945.
In an attack on the Shuri Line, "the greatest concentration
of artillery every employed in the Pacific war," [3,267] led
the preparation for the assault. Twenty-seven battalions of
artillery from 105's to 8-inchers, totalling 324 pieces
thundered down on the enemy. [3,267]
Further discussion, to include the cannon delivery of an
atomic shell, guided missiles and computerized fire direction
such as FADAC and TACFIRE would serve little to actually
improve this chronology. In the evolution of modern artillery
through the twenty-seven centuries of this account, it has
progressed from catapult, to bombard, to smooth bore, to
rifled cannon. Just since World War II the field artillery
progressed from simple cannon to guided missiles with nuclear
warheads capable of the destructive force from countless
37

conventional battalions of guns. Which step was a greater
one? This question can be answered only in the mind of the
reader.
At least the historical development since 1945 has the
advantage of recent history. It is much more easily under-
stood since the events took place within most analysts' life-
times. The basic reason for stopping this account at the
conclusion of World War II was that the more recent develop-
ments did not add anything to the following analysis. The
following section limits itself to a conventional, non-nuclear
tactical situation. The use of modern field artillery
missiles was not discussed, and FADAC and TACFIRE are merely
tools that assist the decision maker. They do not influence
his actual decisions.
Conclusively, it can be said that by the end of World War
II the concept of modern artillery employment had developed
brilliantly, and with the exception of tactical nuclear
weapons, and cannon-fired guided projectiles those tactics
serve well the following analysis. Granted, the helicopter
has been used to provide undreamed of mobility to 105 's and
155-mm howitzers, but once in position their rules of employ-
ment have not been greatly altered. These two weapons are
almost identical to those howitzers in the hands of artillery-
men from 1941 to 1945, and they are still capable of the
fine record they amassed during that period.
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III. FIRE PLANNING AND FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION
A discussion of modern field artillery must address a
number of preliminary facts as background. In the preceding
section a chronology of field artillery was .presented; be-
ginning with the earliest recorded history, to that point in
the recent past which included all developments necessary
for a look at conventional techniques and employment.
In the historical section, it was seen that the techniques
of employment and tactics, and the fire support considerations
in use today evolved over many centuries, and depended
directly on the degree of sophistication in the weapons at
that time. A strong case was made that modern artillery,
simply could not exist without the technique referred to as
indirect fire. The traditional concepts of employment were
based on the effect of direct fire at relatively close ranges.
The United States mountain artillery as late as the early
1900's was still using direct fire techniques. Field
artillery pieces of the period were thus described, "The front
sight is a plain roughened steel point sight, and is perman-
ently fixed to the right rim base." [4,5] A gunner's quadrant
was placed directly on the tube of the weapon to determine the
proper firing elevation, and the following quotation at least
alludes to something other than direct fire, "the gunner's
quadrant is thoroughly reliable both for direct and curved
fire." [4,6] This traditional direct fire mode is still
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employed in cases of close-in fighting around the guns. As
the recent Viet Nam experience illustrates, the use of
improved munitions such as the "beehive" round were extremely
effective against masses of infantry personnel in assault
formation at close ranges.
However, the ability to provide "continuous and timely
fire support," [14,3] as the basic mission of the artillery
claims, requires indirect fire capability, fire direction
centers (FDC's), and a common grid to permit massing and
lateral reinforcing of artillery units. Although one of the
capabilities of the artillery is direct fire, as it has been
since use of the very first cannons; today indirect fire
permits a whole spectrum of fire support, to include: the
rapid shifting of fires , massing of fires of several units,
firing from and into defilade, accurate fires without adjust-
ment (with prior registration), and aerial fire support.
The chief difference between the old and the new in the
use of artillery fire is, "the degree of precision attained,"
[7,204] The early artillery fired relatively blindly, and
placed reliance on the sheer volume of artillery fire, while
modern artillery techniques take advantage of increased
accuracy and effectiveness to better support the maneuver
elements.
A. STANDARD TACTICAL MISSIONS
Before discussing fire support, it is necessary to look
at the four standard tactical missions assigned field artil-
lery units, for this assignment dictates the fire support
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responsibilities of a particular unit. There are four stan-
dard missions which may be assigned to a field artillery
battalion: direct support CDS), reinforcing (R)
,
general
support reinforcing (GSR), and general support (GS) . [14,10]
(Appendix B) These missions provide varying degrees of
centralized control under the force artillery commander, and
varying degrees of responsiveness to the needs of the sup-







Figure 6. Cone of Responsiveness
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Figure six shows the relationship between each of the four
standard tactical missions and their ability to respond to
the fire requests of a particular unit. Note that in the DS
role, artillery has immediate response to the smallest maneu-
ver unit commander, whereas in the general support, the artil-
lery is in support of the entire operation, and does not fire
until the large unit commander gives it a specific mission.
Centralized control and responsiveness are opposing quantities
As one increases the other must decrease.
Understanding of the four tactical missions facilitates
the grasp of concepts and tactics of modern field artillery.
As each mission is addressed, the term centralized control
will be referred to as a desirable quality. When control is
centralized at the highest level appropriate, field artillery
becomes more efficient. Flexibility in employment, massing
of fires, and uniformity of support are all gained when the
large unit controls the fire. In some situations
such as the fast moving offensive operation, the artillery
must be responsible to the small maneuver unit commander, and
the direct support mission is appropriate. The degree of
responsiveness in the assault necessitates a decrease in the
control by the overall commander of his artillery assets.
The direct support mission provides the least centralized
control, and the greatest responsiveness to the maneuver
unit's requests for fire. Although the DS artillery unit
remains under the command of its next higher artillery unit
commander, its mission requires continuous availability to
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support the maneuver element, so close coordination and
planning must exist with the supported headquarters. The
most typical DS role places an artillery battalion in support
of a maneuver brigade. The sector of fire for this artillery
is determined by the boundaries of the supported maneuver
unit. Generally the three firing batteries of an artillery
tube battalion are assigned direct support missions for the
three maneuver battalions in the brigade. This relationship
is maintained as long as it is tactically feasible.
The reinforcing mission refers to the reinforcing of
artillery fires by another artillery unit. Artillery always
reinforces other artillery units, and supports maneuver units.
The mission of reinforcing is used to augment the fires of
anotber artillery unit. The reinforced unit plans and con-
trols the fires for the reinforcing unit, even though the R
artillery remains under its own command channels. The sector
of fire for this artillery is determined by the sector of
fire for the reinforced artillery unit.
The mission of general support - reinforcing allows a
certain amount of centralized control. In the general support
portion of this composite mission, the artillery furnishes
fire support to the force as a whole and additionally re-
inforces another artillery unit. Priority of fire goes to
the force artillery headquarters rather than to the reinforced
unit. This mission is the most flexible of the standard
tactical missions. Here, the sector of fire depends on its
assigned fire support area.
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An artillery unit supports the force as a whole, and
maximizes the quality of centralized control with an assigned
mission of general support. These units are part of the
force commander's personnel, "hip pocket** artillery, to re-
main available for influencing the combat at the time and
place the commander deems appropriate. In a GS role, the
area of fire is the entire force sector, until a specific
fire support mission is assigned.
The basic missions may be modified to fit a particular
operation or a special situation. The discussion of artil-
lery fire support must include fire planning, and fire
support coordination. In a combined arms operation artillery
fire support is only one of the types of fires available. In
most operations, the maneuver force will have fire support
available from one or more of the following: attack helicop-
ters, close air support, and naval gunfire. Artillery support
is further broken down into aerial artillery, cannons, and
missiles; all with both conventional and nuclear rounds and
war heads. In this analysis we will consider only cannon
artillery in the conventional fire support role.
Fire support and maneuver must be coordinated to a high
degree. In many instances the very success of a combat force
depends on proper planning and coordination of the firing
units and the maneuver elements. It is the responsibility of
a field artillery fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) to
integrate the efforts of all fire support means available -




Fire planning is exercized at all levels from company to
field army. It will serve here to note that artillery fire
can be classified as against planned targets or targets of
opportunity. These planned targets are either scheduled --
fired at a predetermined time, or on-call -- fired on request.
On-call targets are planned targets as contrasted with targets-
of-opportunity which are not preplanned, but none the less
are important sources of support. The degree of detail and
length of the fire support annex are limited only by time.
The fire planning is a continuing process that constantly re-
fines and updates targets until the operation is concluded.
Each level consolidates all targeting information and passes
it to the next higher fire support coordinator to provide a
detailed aggregation of targets and priorities for the force
commander. (Fig- 7) (Appendix C)
Fires are planned in support of combat operations, both
offensive and defensive in nature. Because of the different
techniques involved, fire planning for the offense will be
discussed first. Both types of planned fires should cover
critical areas, such as enemy locations (whether confirmed,
suspect, or likely), and prominent terrain features (such as
hill tops or road junctions). In essence, fires are planned
to hinder the enemy and deny him ground, and to prevent
























Figure 7. Artillery fire planning channels
Legend: Infantry Battalion Brigade level unit
—
X
Artillery Battalionon-g Division level unit- XX
Corps level unit— XXX
In an offensive operation artillery fires are planned to
engage the enemy before the artillery preparation, during the
preparation, and during the attack. The first category of
fires includes such fires as: targets-of-opportunity, cover-
ing fires for the deployment of the attacking force, registra-
tions, and harassment. The latter is provided to pin down
the enemy and disrupt his communications and command channels.
Care must be taken in this phase of support of offensive




The artillery" preparation is, "prearranged fire delivered
in accordance with a time schedule in support of an attack."
[16,6] The maneuver unit commander decides whether or not to
fire a preparation, and how long and intense it should be.
The time length of a preparation is dependent on the degree
of surprise desired, the available ammunition, and the number
of targets. Its duration can be anywhere from a few minutes
to several hours depending on the particular objective to be
attacked. The force commander can consult his fire support
coordinator for the calculation of a standard equation that





where: T = The time length of the preparation.
X = The number of targets to be scheduled.
P = The planning time, the total time in minutes
required per target.
M = The method of attack, the number of batteries
employed.
N = The total number of artillery batteries available
for employment.
It should be emphasized that since average values are
used for planning time, the final time length of the prepara-
tion is only an approximate, minimum value.
Phasing is used in a preparation to permit the attacking
of priority targets early, and to better support the maneuver
force. The initial phase includes counterbattery fire and
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enemy observation posts. The second phase includes the
attack of command posts, lines of communication and known
or suspected enemy assembly areas. The phase just prior to
the assault should concentrate on the enemies forward
defensive areas.
During the attack by the maneuver force the fire planner
considers those targets that will assist the advance of the
supported unit. These targets can be further classified as
in-front-of, beyond, and on the objective. These fires too
are fired in phases consistent with the progress of the
friendly unit. The fires planned in-front-of the objective
engage enemy observation posts, forward defensive positions
and weapons locations; to assist the advance of the maneuver
force. Of course these targets must be attacked before the
friendly advance comes within the danger region. It is
extremely important that the fire planner monitor the progress
of the friendly maneuver forces to insure that over-run
targets are not brought under fire.
Those targets planned on the objective are fired next to
destroy or neutralize enemy resistance against the final
assault of the maneuver unit. Of course forward observers
moving with the maneuver force will be firing targets-of-
opportunity as they appear. These fires cannot be planned
ahead of time, but are extremely important in the overall
support scheme.
The area beyond the objective is covered with planned
fire and attacked after the other two phases mentioned. Those
48

fires planned beyond the final objective of the friendly-
maneuver force serve to protect the friendly unit during its
reorganization on the objective. These fires cover likely
avenues of approach that could serve the enemy in launching a
counterattack. They also serve to prevent the enemy from
reinforcing or reorganizing his disengaged forces. See
Figure 8 for a summary of offensive fire planning.
PHASES OF FIRE TARGET CATEGORIES
1. Fire before the preparation. 1. Targets of opportunity.
Covering fires for maneuver.
Registration.
Harassment and interdiction.
2. Preparation Fire. 2. Counterbattery and enemy OP's.
Fires against enemy command
posts and communications.
Forward defensive positions.
3. Fires during the attack. 3. Forward positions and OP's.
Objective area.
Enemy avenues of approach.
All preceding categories as
time and ammunition permit.
Figure 8. Offensive fire planning
In defensive operations artillery fire has an equally
important role as in the offense. Defensive artillery fire
is planned in several phases. Basically their goal is to
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engage targets before the enemy can organize for an attack,
while the enemy attack is in progress, and to support a
friendly counterattack. [16,9]
Those fires planned for delivery prior to the enemy
attack include harassing and interdiction, in order to pre-
cipitate an early deployment by the enemy; and fires in
support of friendly security elements, such as patrols placed
forward for early warning.
Counterpreparation fire is also considered in this cate-
gory of fire planning. The counterpreparation is, "intense
prearranged fire delivered when the imminence of the enemy
attack is discovered." [16,10] The artillery counterprepara-
tion is planned to break-up and disorganize the enemy, and
decrease the effect of his artillery preparation. This
action, if successful, blunts the enemy's offensive action
and in the ideal case, either delays or cancels the impending
attack.
The first priority in a counterpreparation is given to
counterbattery targets, forward maneuver elements, and enemy
observation posts. Next, the lines of communication, command
posts, reserves, and resupply facilities are fired upon.
The decision to fire a counterpreparation is made by the
maneuver force commander. The timing for this fire is most
critical. For example, if the counterpreparation comes too
early, friendly artillery locations are revealed and little
damage is done. If fired too late, there will be no need for
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a counterpreparation at all. The units will be involved
defending against the actual enemy attack.
When the enemy successfully gets into position to ini-
tiate his attack other planned fires should be delivered.
These fires attempt to break up the enemy attack formations,
and limit the extent of his penetration. The fires delivered
during attack are the final protective fires (FPF's), and
the requests from forward observers on targets-of -opportunity.
The FPF is a stationary line of targets around the outer
perimeter of a friendly unit. This prearranged barrier of
fire integrates all available fire power along a defensive
line to protect the friendly unit. The shape and depth of
the FPF is varied to fit the appropriate maneuver forces and
the caliber of the supporting weapons. All artillery gives
absolute priority to calls for firing the FPF, and direct
support artillery set their guns on the appropriate elevation
and deflection of the FPF any time they are not engaged in
other fire missions. It is the responsibility of the artil-
lery forward observer to adjust fire, piece by piece on the
desired location in the FPF. (Thus each gun is literally
fired-in.
)
Another type of fire planned for defensive operations is
the targets supporting a counterattack. These targets must
be closely coordinated with the maneuver elements to insure
adequate support. In planning fires for a counterattack, the
fire planner tries to stop or blunt the nose of the enemy
penetration, and to seal off the base of the penetration to
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prevent the enemy from either reinforcing or withdrawing his
forces. See Figure 9 for a summary of defensive fire planning
Once again the fire support coordinator must remain abreast
of the movement of the friendly maneuver force to cancel those
targets behind their line of progress.
PHASES OF FIRE TARGET CATEGORIES
1. Fires before the enemy can
organize.
1. Counterpreparation.
Counterbattery and enemy OP's.
2. Fires during the attack. 2. Targets of opportunity.
Final protective fires.
3. Fires during the counter-
attack.
3. Targets of opportunity.
Blocking and channeling of
the enemy.
Figure 9. Defensive fire planning
Two additional types of fire should be mentioned here:
Barrage fire is a technique devised to fire into a pre-
arranged area to literally fill the space, rather than to be
aimed at specific targets. [16,12] The use of barrage fire
is not an efficient use of ammunition, since it requires very
large amounts of ammunition for limited casualties. Barrage
fire is not frequently used by the United States Army.
Counterbattery fire has been mentioned several times earlier.
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This fire is adequately explained by its name. It is that
fire, "delivered for the purpose of destroying or neutralizing
indirect fire weapons systems." [16,13] Counterbattery tar-
gets are always given very high priority by the fire planners
for obvious reasons.
It has been shown how artillery fire planning is import-
ant in both of fensive and defensive operations. The artillery
fire support is used in a manner consistent with the actions
of the supported unit. During this discussion of fire
planning, numerous references were made to the fire support
coordinator. Fire support coordination ties in with fire
planning channels, and it is necessary to the understanding
of artillery decision making, to have a firm concept of how
a fire support coordinator fits into the overall scheme of
artillery fire support.
C. FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION
Fire support coordination, "is not a new procedure or
technique; its basic principles have existed for many years."
[17,1] As the modern battlefield saw improvements in the
speed and range of delivery systems, the use of close air
support, the increased lethality of weapons, and the greater
mobility of modern maneuver units; it became obvious that
each level of command must have some one coordinate the
fires available to the commander, and advise him as to their
use. It is only at the lowest level, that the maneuver
company commander is himself the FSCOORD, but even here the
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artillery forward observers are available for advice and
assistance. At battalion level and higher, an artilleryman













Note: At all except the lowest level, the artillery commander is
responsible.
Figure 10. Fire support coordinators
Fire support coordination is defined as, "planning and
executing of fire, so that targets are adequately covered by
a weapon or group of weapons." [17,2] This definition
indicates how fire planning and fire support coordination are
closely related. The preceding section on fire planning
addressed only that phase. The FSCOORD however, is concerned
with execution as well as the planning of artillery fires.
The fire support coordinator is responsible for advising
the force commander on all fire support matters, to include
the complete friendly artillery capacity and the extent of
the enemy artillery threat. At the lowest level, the maneu-
ver company, the company commander coordinates his own
direct support artillery fire and mortars, and integrates
their fire into his particular scheme of maneuver. The
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company commander is advised by his artillery forward
observer, who is more familiar with the capabilities and
limitations of the available artillery. The company com-
mander has more overall experience however, and takes respon-
sibility for fire support decisions at this level. The
fire planning at the maneuver company level is consolidated
in the form of target lists from his artillery and mortar
forward observers by the maneuver company commander. The
artillery FO then submits his target list to the fire support
officer at the maneuver battalion. (Appendix C)
The fire support officer at the maneuver battalion is an
artillery officer, usually from the artillery unit (DS) supply-
ing the fire support. The FSCOORD at this level is respon-
sible for compiling target lists and determining the fire
support needs of the maneuver battalion. He also acts as an
advisor to the maneuver battalion commander and his staff on
artillery matters. He combines target lists from the three
maneuver companies and submits an overall fire support require-
ment and target list to the direct support artillery battalion.
See Figure 7 and Appendix C.
The artillery battalion S-3, operations officer, has an
extremely important role in decision making at this point.
He is responsible for the battalion fire direction center
(FDC) and has the authority to determine what targets will
be fired upon, and with what weapons, and at what time. The
DS artillery battalion S-3 receives target lists from the
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three maneuver battalions in the brigade and also their fire
support requirements. He also receives target information
and instructions from the next higher command. In this case
from division artillery.
At this level, a FSCOORD advises the brigade commander
and closely coordinates with the DS artillery battalion. The
commander of the artillery battalion in direct support has
overall responsibility for this, and physically serves as
the fire support officer for the brigade.
Fire support coordination is handled by a more formal
arrangement at division and higher levels of command. At
division, corps, and field army levels, this coordination
agency is referred to as the fire support element. (FSE)
.
[17,4] The FSE is responsible for all the coordination measures
that were earlier discussed at the lower levels. The artillery
commander traditionally serves as the FSCOORD for the next
higher maneuver unit commander. For example, division artil-
lery is a brigade size organization supporting a maneuver div-
ision. The division artillery commander serves as the primary
advisor in artillery matters for the division commander. This
relationship has already been discussed at the brigade level,
supported by an artillery battalion.
The maneuver commander is the ultimate decision maker as
to whether or not fire support is used, and sometimes even
as to when it is to be employed. However, the artillery fire
support coordinators make the qualitative decisions in
specific target considerations. The questions of priority,
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amount of fire support required, and type of fire support
with which to attack a specific target; are decided by the
fire support coordinator.
Determining the priority with which targets are attacked
is an important function of a FSCOORD. As earlier discussion
of offensive and defensive fire support indicate, certain
time phases are commonly used in fire planning, and this gives
at least broad priorities to individual targets. The yard-
stick that basically determines the priority of a target, is
the value, or military importance of that target. This value
can be determined by analyzing the potential threat to
friendly forces if the target is attacked, or considering the
material advantage gained toward accomplishment of the
mission if the target is destroyed early.
A system of priorities has been devised to assist the
FSCOORD in his targeting decisions. These extend from
Priority I; defined as, "Targets capable of preventing the
execution of the plan of action." [16,32]; to Priority IV;
defined as, "Targets capable of limited interference with
the execution of the plan of action." [16,32] These priori-
ties seem to have been intentionally written in very nebulous
terms to be generally applicable to any tactical situation.
This wording does allow artillery decision makers a great
deal of flexibility in tailoring their fire support to a
specific scenario. This discussion of artillery fire planning,
and the role of the fire support coordinator should prove
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valuable to any detailed analysis of field artillery deci-
sion making. The final portion of this thesis will indicate




IV. SCENARIO PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION
In the historical development section of this thesis, it
was shown that modern field artillery has evolved over many
centuries to reach its present level of refinement. A great
deal of effort was devoted to developing the idea of the con-
current evolution of artillery techniques with artillery
weaponry. The chronological development indicates the
changes and improvements in weapons, and thus traces the
progress and changing tactics in artillery.
The earlier discussion of fire planning and fire support
coordination was an attempt at capsulizing the fire support
decisions and decision processes that are necessary in the
employment of modern cannon artillery. As with the historic
section, numerous references were consulted, and those items
considered relevant to this work have been included.
In order to better identify the fire support considera-
tions and decision makers, the following general combat
scenario is presented. As was stated in the introduction,
this thesis does not attempt to build a unique working combat
model, nor does it even propose to improve existing ones.
Rather, it attempts to contribute that material considered
necessary to the realistic modelling of artillery.
Artillery is an area fire weapon, in that it is effective
against a given target area rather than a specific point type
target. Artillery can be used in a destruction role, in
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which a specific object, usually a bunker or other immobile
target is fired upon until destroyed. The primary use of
artillery, however, is in its area fire role. The optimal
(and most frequently considered) use for artillery is against
personnel targets with little or no protection.
Although a complete combined arms scenario is usually
considered by those analysts interested in models of combat,
this thesis is directed only toward the artillery portion of
the combined arms team. Consequently, the scenario is fully
discussed only as it regards the artillery fire support
decisions. Consider a conventional, brigade level combat
force (Blue) in a deliberately prepared defensive position.
See Figure 11 for the disposition of Blue forces. An
aggressor (Red) force mounts a combined arms attack against
the friendly defensive unit with a force of undisclosed size.
The following scenario will include the decisions made by the
Blue forces in a defensive posture. The scenario will be
terminated after the discussion of a Blue counterattack.
The Blue brigade occupies a sector of the battlefield with
three maneuver battalions on line. (Fig. 11) In this scen-
ario that force size is approximately 1500 combatants. A
battalion of towed, 155-mm howitzers is in direct support of
the brigade, with the three firing batteries each in direct
support of the three maneuver battalions. Although the
single artillery piece discussed here is the 155-mm howitzer,
a mathematical comparison of effectiveness permits a complete


















Figure 11. Scenario battlefield situation
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The 155 's are frequently considered the basic weapon in
field artillery, and appear in several working combat models
as the standard artillery piece. Each battery of 155's has
six howitzers for a total of 18 tubes in direct support of
the brigade.
The forces are shown in Figure 11 as they are positioned
in this particular situation. As was discussed in the pre-
vious section, the brigade headquarters has a fire support
coordination center, and the DS artillery battalion commander
serves as the brigade FSCOORD. He remains in close contact
with his own staff, and particularly the artillery battalion
S-3 who is responsible for the battalion fire direction
center. As before, this FDC is the central collection point
for target lists from each firing battery; and receives the
brigade fire support requirements, and apportions them to the
three firing batteries.
The Red force is of undisclosed size, but it is known from
intelligence sources that the Red artillery is tube type,
and organized into batteries of six guns each. For conveni-
ence here it is assumed that the Red artillery has the same
priorities in targeting, and fire support procedures as those
discussed in the previous section.
There are two basic techniques for playing a combined
arms combat scenario. The action can be moved through an
iteration of battle by either a "time step" or an "event
step" system. Here we will consider the sequencing of events,
and no further discussion will be devoted to the actual
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techniques of playing through the scenario. Rather, emphasis
will be given to artillery decisions, and fire support
planning.
In our discussion of decisions, it will be well to under-
stand that even though artillery for this scenario is in
direct support, and thus is highly responsive to the needs
of the maneuver force, it maintains its own command structure,
and maintains the authority to make all decisions of a tech-
nical nature. A close coordination with the supported maneu-
ver force is required at all times.
At H-hour, the Red force initiates the battle with a
60-minute artillery preparation. As the first rounds begin
to fall in the brigade sector, the artillery FSCOORD confers
with the maneuver commander. Since the Blue force is in a
posture of defense, extensive fire planning has been done.
(See Figure 9.) All possible enemy assembly areas, opposing
artillery positions, and likely avenues of approach have been
adequately covered with fire.
After discussion with his FSCOORD, the brigade commander
decides to fire the counterpreparation. This previously
planned group of targets concentrates on counterbattery fire,
and fire against known enemy observation posts. This early
phase of the counterpreparation attempts to reduce the effect
of Red artillery on both the maneuver force and gun positions.
The Blue FO's actively search out enemy battery positions,





It is significant here that the important decision to
fire the counterpreparation was made by the maneuver commander.
However, the multitude of decisions as to target priorities,
the number and type of rounds to fire on each target, etc.
are made earlier by the fire planners. These artillerymen
balance the needs of the tactical situation with the available
ammunition and supporting weapons, and tailor the fire to the
specific tactical situation. That is a strong argument for
not using an arbitrary number like firepower scores, or a
monte-carlo technique for determining fire planning decisions.
When the requirement to fire a counterpreparation comes down
to the artillery battalion, the information is sent to each
battery FDC, and the prearranged fire is commenced.
As the Blue artillery brings effective fire on the Red
forces, the preparation noticably decreases in intensity. As
the Red preparation is shifted, their maneuver elements begin
a frontal assault on the center of the brigade sector. As
the assault forces close with the Blue unit, their forward
observers pick up excellent targets of opportunity before they
are required to displace rearward. During the initial stages
of the attack the artillery battalion S-3 determines priorities
and approves fire missions. The priority of fire at this
phase goes to counterbattery fire to neutralize the Red
indirect fire weapons, and targets of opportunity delivered
to break up and stall the enemy attack formations.
As the assault successfully moves closer to the actual
FEBA, the final protective fire, consisting of artillery and
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mortars if fired. The decision to fire the FPF is made by
the force commander at the critical time in the battle. The
FPF effectively halts the Red assault, and now Blue artillery
pours devastating fire on the enemy. As the FO's pick out
targets of opportunity, the Red force suffers serious
attrition.
Meanwhile at Blue force headquarters, plans are being
finalized to initiate a counterattack. Since the enemy had
been channeled by the effect of the Blue artillery, and
stopped by the maneuver forces, we see how the combined arms
battle depends on the coordination between maneuver and their
artillery fire support. Once the Red attack stalls, Blue
artillery fire is shifted to seal off the enemy position and
prevent the reinforcing or resupplying of the committed
force.
A separate fire support appendix had been previously
prepared by the FSCC in support of the counterattack plan.
Once again we see the overall decision to act made by the
maneuver commander. But once again, the artillery FSCOORD
and artillery planning channels have adequately analyzed the
tactical situation and have made important decisions concern-
ing the implementation of fire support.
Let us leave this scenario with the completion of a
successful counterattack and a reoccupation of the Blue
positions along the forward edge of the battle area CFEBA)
.
Although it would be productive to continue the Blue attack
and illustrate how offensive fire planning (Fig- 8) enters
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this particular scenario, that is redundant to this discussion.
Instead an effort to review the decisions made in the scenario
to date is appropriate. The detailed walking through of
both offensive and defensive phases of this scenario (as out-
lined here) would be highly enlightening, and is worthy of
further thesis work to continue this investigation.
In the scenario just presented two important aspects of
decision making are shown. As was stated in the introduction,
the artillery has no mission, but to support the maneuver
force. It therefore is logical, that the doctrine as pre-
sented earlier concerning the decisions of the maneuver
commander is realistic. Note as the situation unfolds the
decisions to fire a counterpreparation, to fire the FPF and
to initiate the counterattack were all made by the maneuver
commander. Granted, he is advised by his artillery FSCOORD,
but the artilleryman can only advise. The artillery decisions
then are concerned with those technical judgments concerned
with the actual delivery of fire. These fires can be effec-
tive in supporting the maneuver element only if these deci-
sions are made intelligently, and extensive fire planning is
accomplished. It appears obvious in retrospect that the
areas of fire planning and fire support coordination are
extremely important consideration in any artillery model.
It is hoped that future work on artillery decision
processes will extend to investigating specific considera-
tions such as: available ammunition per tube, ammunition
supply rate, and overall fire control procedures. The state
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of the art in combat models needs much effort to realistic-
ally input artillery into a combined arms scenario. The use
of field artillery on the modern battlefield cannot adequately
be represented by simple firepower values for the capability
against an opposing force. It has been shown how the overall
maneuver force commander is an important decision maker, even
in artillery considerations. The artillerymen are ultimately
responsible for decisions concerned with the priority of tar-
gets, the amount of fire allotted for a particular target,
and what type of fire support should best be used. Artillery-
men are also responsible (although it has not been addressed
here) for the positioning, resupply, communication nets, and
movement of each individual artillery unit.
The use of field artillery techniques and the fire support
decisions discussed in this thesis cannot help but assist
analysts in modelling artillery for combined arms combat sim-
ulations. An understanding of field artillery operations is
best acquired by those military officers responsible for,
and experienced in, the conduct of fire support in actual
combat. Unfortunately these people do not generally have the
other analytic tools to devise a realistic artillery model.
Interface between the professional soldiers and the profes-
sional analysts will add immeasurably to the overall analysis




GLOSSARY OF COMMON ARTILLERY TERMS
The following common terms in field artillery were taken
from the text of references 16 and 17.
Airstrike - -An attack on a specific objective by fighter,
bomber, or attack aircraft on an offensive mission.
All available --A command or request to obtain the fire of
all artillery able to deliver effective fire on a given
target.
Area of operations (AO) --That area necessary for military
operations, either offensive or defensive in nature.
Basic load --A specific amount of ammunition prescribed by the
Army to be in the possession of each type organization.
Buffer Zone - -That area immediately adjacent to friendly troops
into which the armed helicopters will not fly.
Call for fire --A request for fire containing data necessary
for obtaining the required fire on a target.
Conventional weapons - -Nonnuclear weapons, excluding chemical
rounds
.
Counterbattery fire --Fire delivered for the purpose of
destroying or neutralizing indirect fire weapons.
Counterpreparation - - Intense prearranged fire delivered when
the imminence of an enemy attack is discovered.
Covering fire --Fire used to protect assaulting troops when
they are within range of enemy small arms.
Destruction fire - -Fire delivered for the sole purpose of
destroying material objects.
Final Protective fire (FPF) ~~ An immediately available pre-
arranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemy move-
ment across defensive lines.
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Fire mission --A specific assignment given to a firing unit
as part of a definite plan.
Fire plan --A tactical plan for using the weapons of a unit
so that their fires will be coordinated.
Fire support coordination center (FSCC) --A single location
at battalion and brigade levels in which are centralized
communications facilities and personnel incident to the
coordination of all forms of fire support.
Harassing fire --Fire delivered for purposes of disturbing
the rest, curtailing the movement, and lowering the morale
of enemy troops by the threat of casualties or losses in
material.
Interdiction fire --Fire delivered for the purpose of denying
the enemy the unrestricted use of an area or point.
Neutralization fire --Fire delivered to hamper and interrupt
movement and/or the firing of weapons.
On-call target --A planned target to be fired on request rather
than in accordance with a time schedule.
Planned target --A target on which fire is prearranged.
Preparation - - Intense prearranged fire delivered in accordance
~ with a time schedule in support of an attack, to disrupt
the enemy's command and communication, disorganize his
defenses, and neutralize his fire support means.
Protective fire --Fire delivered by supporting guns and
directed against the enemy to hinder his fire or move-
ment against friendly forces.
Scheduled target --A planned target on which fire is to be
delivered in accordance with a time schedule.
Series of targets --A number of targets and/or groups of tar-
gets planned to support a maneuver phase.
Supporting fire --Fire delivered by supporting units to
assist or protect a unit in combat.
Target - -Personnel , material, or a piece of terrain that is
designated and numbered for reference and/or firing.
Target of opportunity --A target which has not been planned.
Time on Target --The method of firing on a target in which
various artillery units and naval gunfire ships so time
their fires, that the first projectiles from all weapons
reach the target simultaneously.
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Zone of fire --An area within which a particular artillery-




This appendix is provided to summarize the effective
responsibilities each of the four standard tactical missions
Artillery with a Answers calls for Establishes liaison Establishes com-
————^^^^-
Has as its zone of




General support. 1. Force artillery No inherent re- No inherent re- Zone of supported
headquarters. quirement. quirement. unit/formation.
2. Own observers.









Reinforcing. 1. Reinforced Reinforced Reinforced Zone of fire of
artillery unit. artillery unit. artillery unit. reinforced artil-
2. Own observers. lery unit.
3. Force artillery
headquarters.
Direct support. 1. Supported unit. Supported unit Supported unit. Zone of supported
2. Own observers. (down to bat- unit.
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FSCOORD IS THE MANEUVER
COMPANY COMMANDER
BATTALION BRIGADE
FSCOORD IS THE COMMANDER OF THE ARTY BN IN
DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE BRIGADE
(SAME AS ABOVE)
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